Immediately following the invasion, the United States had called for an Israeli withdrawal and cease-fire in the United Nations, a proposal vetoed by the British and French in the Security Council. Dulles therefore wanted to call the General Assembly to condemn the aggression. Unless the United States showed leadership in the UN, Dulles feared that the door would be flung open to a large-scale Soviet penetration of the Middle East. But asserting leadership would once again place the United States in a middleman position between the European powers and the Arab states. Dulles explained:
For many years now the United States has been walking a tightrope between the effort to maintain our old and valued relations with our British and French allies on the one hand and, on the other, trying to assure ourselves of the friendship and understanding of the newly independent countries who have escaped from colonialism.
Dulles thought the Suez invasion was a watershed in relations with the allies and the United States should therefore oppose it 'by every appropriate means '. 3 While Dulles may have been an exception, the rest of the American foreign policy establishment was, perhaps, more persuaded about the importance of 'the newly independent countries' in a Cold War context, than concerned for indigenous peoples. Just prior to the Suez invasion, the National Security Council completed a study on French North Africa. On the situation in Algeria, the paper concluded:
The Arab population is generally illiterate, unwashed, and unskilled. So far as it has had any political education, this has been of a sterile and conformist sort to which the only alternative has been terrorism and armed rebellion. There is no traditional institution of national government, nor is there any clearly defined Algerian nationality. An independent Algeria, run by the majority would put power in the hands of a grossly unprepared people. 4 In the NSC meeting described above, only Harold Stassen, Director of the Mutual Security Office, opposed Dulles. Stassen wanted to avoid an open break with Britain and France, but was quickly overruled by the combined forces of Eisenhower and Dulles. Secretaries Humphrey and Wilson argued for less strident measures, but in the end were persuaded to accept the proposed policy. 5
